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Abstract
Assuming that a paralogism is an unintentionally invalid reasoning, we
give an exempliﬁcation by means of three epistemic paradoxes, namely:
Fitch's Paradox, Moore's Paradox, and Zemach's Paradox. A common symp-
tom lies on the basis of these three paralogisms, which concerns the satisfaction-
conditions of a discourse about truth. From an anti-realist understanding of
the paradoxes, we propose an alternative semantic framework in which the
meaning of sentences relies upon a question-answer game. Then we set forth
some features of this many-valued framework, before applying it to the three
preceding paradoxes and displaying its general prospect.
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1. Logical paradoxes: one trouble, two treat-
ments
A logical paradox is a thought defect that one strives to correct; it occurs
within a reasoning, when the premises are taken to be unanimously true but
lead to a conclusion which is not taken to be so. The expected ending of
a paradox is its resolution: the ﬁrst point is to understand how the conclu-
sion has been introduced and, then, to determine the way in which such an
undesired result should be deleted.
A similar form of defecting thought is to be distinguished from the para-
dox, namely: the paralogism, where the reasoning includes a premise that
is unanimously true in appearance but turns out to be false from a certain
point of view. The conclusion thus relies upon an initial misunderstanding,
so that the problem is solved by its not being so any more. A famous case
of paralogism is the naturalistic fallacy, in which the diﬃculty stems from
mistaking a value judgment for a factual judgment. In the same vein, we will
turn our attention to another kind of paralogism: an epistemic paralogism,
where the trouble stems from mistaking a knowledge statement for a sentence
about knowledge.
Some kinds of paralogism may be more diﬃcult to eradicate, because
they require a preliminary reﬂection about which premise should be rejected.
In other words, the borderline between paradoxes and paralogisms may be
muddled in case of a disagreement about the origin of the trouble. The Liar
Paradox is a typical case in point: the origin of the trouble and the suggested
treatments are not uniquely identiﬁed within the community of logicians,
because their assessment of the reasoning needn't rely upon one and the
same norm of rationality. If so, the disagreement is about the nature of the
suggested solution; Graham Priest's solution of dialetheism is a radical sort
of assessment where the initial problem is not even considered as such.
By supporting philosophy with the help of logical analysis, philosophical
logic corresponds to the set of logical systems developed in order to deal with
paradoxes and give a better understanding of the philosophical concepts that
generated the trouble. Although a paradox is commonly viewed as a defect
of the reasoning, there is a sensible diﬀerence between the rectiﬁcation of
such a reasoning and its clariﬁcation: the former method cancels the defect
by submitting thought to the norms of logic; the latter takes the defect into
account by researching the mechanisms of thought that led to the undesired
conclusion. To rectify the reasoning is to make use of logic as a normative
model for thought. To clarify the reasoning is to see logic as a descriptive
instrument, i.e. a way among several ones to describe the diﬀerent steps of
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reasoning that lead to the blamed conclusion. The current trend pays scant
attention of the rectifying stance; rather, it counts on the descriptive role of
logic in the process of explanation. Rightly or wrongly, depending upon the
light thrown by this description.
Let us consider three examples of epistemic paradoxes which, it seems to
us, are paralogisms including one and the same false premise from a certain
point of view. False, in the sense that its introduction is unacceptable from
the perspective of the logic assumed by its speaker.
2. Epistemic paradoxes: three symptoms, one
explanation
The traditional deﬁnition of knowledge is taken to be granted, but it may
lead to a paradoxical situation if one takes into account the context in which
this concept is introduced. Following the deﬁnition from Plato's Theaetetus,
a given agent x knows something (expressed by a sentence p) if and only
if: (1) x believes that p, (2) x has a justiﬁcation for p, and (3) p is true.
A reformulation of Plato's deﬁnition leads to the Principle of Factivity for
knowledge: Kp→ p, which means that the knowledge of p entails the truth of
p. Such a principle seems to be taken for granted, because of the very meaning
of the concept of knowledge; however, its application to some contexts of
discourse may be troublesome if one takes into account the way in which an
agent is entitled to be said to know something.
Let us consider the case of anti-realism. This epistemological theory takes
the opposite position of the Platonician deﬁnition of knowledge, insofar as it
reverses the explanatory roles between the concepts of knowledge and truth:
it is not truth that occurs there as a necessary condition to the acquisition
of knowledge; to the contrary, it is knowledge that helps to characterize the
truth of a sentence in terms of knowability.
Now logic seems to establish that such a theory, legitimate as it may be,
leads to a paradox that threatens its soundness: Fitch's Paradox. Starting
from the anti-realist Principle of Knowability, according to which any sen-
tence is true only if it is possible for an agent to have a proof for its truth, the
logical analysis introduces an operator of possibility in order to express this
principle as follows: p→ ♦Kp. Such an assumption entails an unacceptable
conclusion through a set of premises and inference rules that seem to hold
beyond doubt.
We begin by substituting in p → ♦Kp the complex formula (p ∧ ∼Kp)
to the initial sentence p. It follows that the presumed truth of the premise
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p → ♦p implies that of its direct consequence (p ∧ ∼Kp) → ♦K(p ∧ ∼Kp).
One of the admitted inference rules in the demonstration of the paradox is
the closure of knowledge upon conjunction, that is: K(A ∧ B) → (KA ∧
KB); the latter implies in turn the presumed truth of (p ∧ ∼Kp) → ♦(Kp ∧
K∼Kp). And given that the Principle of Factivity seems taken for granted,
its application leads to the consequence (p ∧ ∼Kp) → ♦(Kp ∧ ∼Kp) which
is not admissible: it is not possible to know and not to know that p is
true at once; but this is exactly what is meant by the above consequent.
An application of the rule of reductio ad absurdum implies in turn that the
falsehood of this consequent generates the falsehood of its antecedent, i.e.
the falsehood of (p ∧ ∼Kp). Now if this initial substitution instance is
logically false, its negation is logically true and one deduces from it the true
statement that every true sentence is known: p → Kp. Does this whole
demonstration really mean that the anti-realist Principle of Knowability is
logically indefensible; or does the trouble actually stem from either one of the
inference rules that have just been applied? To the question which of these
inference rules is responsible of the undesired conclusion, a good number
of diﬀerent solutions has been propounded within the abundant literature
devoted to the resolution of Fitch's Paradox and its resolution.1
The point is now to identify the origin of the problem in the derivation:
the adoption of the substitution instance (p ∧ ∼Kp). Instead of blaming
either of the inference rules, our following assessment suspects this paralogism
to introduce a sentence that is incompatible with the point of view of the
anti-realist: how can such an agent claim a sentence to be true if (s)he is
not entitled to know it to be so? This is what is implied by the substitution
instance, however. If it is so, then the trouble does not come from the
Principle of Knowability but lies in the sentences liable to be uttered by the
anti-realist.
This is not the whole story, since the dissolution of Fitch's paradox
is not so much relevant so long as it does not ﬁnd any application beyond
this particular problem. And it does, or it seems so: this alleged paradox
appears to be symptomatic of a more general problem about the making of
a truth-claim. Fitch (1963) states this point in the form of a theorem:
Theorem 1. If a is a truth class which is closed with respect to conjunction elim-
ination, then the proposition, [p ∧ ∼(αp)], which asserts that p is true but not a
1A case in point is Wansing (2002). Most of the solutions consist in rejecting either
of the inference rules in order to block the undesired conclusion, and the choice of the
rejected rule may depend upon the logical system assumed by the arguer: intuitionist
logic, paraconsistent logic, relevance logic, etc. We do not follow this way of clarifying
the paradox, here: we suspect the problem to come from the meaning of one particular
sentence that is admitted by any of these logical systems.
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member of α (where p is any proposition), is itself necessarily not a member of α.2
The two following paradoxes clearly exemplify this established rule for
the discourse about truth, where α applies to the concept of knowledge and
is also extended to the concept of belief. Admittedly, the modal operator of
belief does not belong to this truth class mentioned by Fitch, in the sense
that Fitch's paradox calls for the Principle of Factivity in order to obtain
the paradoxical conclusion. Nevertheless, Moore's Paradox will show that
knowledge and belief are equally symptomatic of a more general problem
concerning the discourse about truth, rather than truth as such. The problem
is related to the veracity of a knowledge statement, and not to the factivity
of any stated knowledge.
The ﬁrst example is Moore's Paradox, which is as famous in epistemic
modal logic as the preceding case. Georges Edward Moore argued that these
two kinds of formulas are absurd but noncontradictory: It is raining, but I
don't believe it, and It is not raining, but I believe it. It is true that these
two formulas are not self-contradictory in epistemic modal logic, assuming
that the expression of truth is symbolized by the occurrence of a sentential
variable p. The ﬁrst formula takes the logical form p ∧ ∼Bp, and the second
has the form ∼p ∧ Bp that is not any more objectionable from a seman-
tic point of view. Yet they are from a pragmatic point of view, as notably
claimed by Hintikka (1962): the trouble does not come from that which these
sentences talk about but, rather, from whoever talks about these, i.e. from
their utterance by a speaker. Hence the semi-performative character of
Moore's Paradox, according to which uttering a declarative sentence about
a state of aﬀairs commits the speaker in telling the truth about it3. Let us
call by Sincerity Clause this pragmatic principle inherited from Austin, to
the eﬀect that a declarative discourse proceeds as an act of assertion whose
satisfaction requires the speaker to believe the truth of what (s)he says as
a precondition. Therefore, a treatment of this problem means a transition
from the semantic level of the relations between language and the world to
the pragmatic level of the relations between language and its users, in accor-
dance to Charles Morris' tripartition between the syntactic, semantic, and
2Fitch (1963), p. 138. The truth class corresponds to the set of sentences that satisfy
the Principle of Factivity: αp → p.
3Hintikka (1962) thus argues: Given the fallacious aspect of the introspective argu-
ments, it is important to realize that none of the conditions or rules that we adopted thus
far is based on these. The arguments we gave for them concerned all the circumstances
in which a set of explicitly made statements can be reasonably said to be defensible. No
reference has been made to what can be known by inspecting on one's mind. (p. 55,
my italics). For a detailed review of Moore's Paradox and his illocutionary reading, see
Schang (2007), especially section 2.2.4.2.2.
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pragmatic features of language. Hintikka encoded such a transition into his
formal language: in doxastic modal terms, a formalization of the problem
consists in going from the self-consistent (logically defensible) level of the
sentences p ∧ ∼Bp and ∼p ∧ Bp to the self-contradictory (logically indefen-
sible) level of their statements p ∧ ∼Bp and ∼p ∧ Bp; a formal translation
of the Sincerity Clause can be performed by inserting the initial sentences
into the scope of a further doxastic operator B: B(p ∧ ∼Bp) and B(∼p ∧ Bp).
The modal logical properties of belief entail that the speaker both believes
and does not believe that p is true:
B(p ∧ ∼Bp) ↔ (Bp ∧ B∼Bp) ↔ (Bp ∧ ∼Bp),
and
B(∼p ∧ Bp) ↔ (B∼p ∧ BBp) ↔ (B∼p ∧ Bp) ↔ (∼Bp ∧ Bp).
Therefore, the intermediary procedure of formalization helps to show that
the initial absurdity of the sentences comes now with a contradictoriness of
their statement. Furthermore, the pragmatic explanation in terms of speech
acts avoids any muddling detour through psychological arguments of intro-
spection or transparency of the mental states in order to account for the
occurrence of the paradox: the Moorean speaker believes that (s)he believes
that it is raining (or not) just because (s)he just said it and cannot thereby
retract what (s)he just aﬃrmed.
The second example corroborates the preceding in the form of an apparent
logical circularity that equally brings out the origin the problem. Zemach
(1969) depicted it as a pragmatic paradox that has to do with the third
criterion of the Platonician knowledge. Returning to the point of view of
the speaker, the latter is entitled to say that p is true only if (s)he is in
position to acknowledge that: (s)he believes that p is true; (s)he has a proof
for p; p is true. Now saying that p is true requires us to have the proof of
it as a precondition and, therefore, to know it. Therefore, the criterion for
the statement of a truth proceeds in such a way that knowledge becomes a
necessary condition to the aﬃrmation of truth. For
once I discovered that the [third] condition is met, i.e. that p is the case, I know
that p: it is impossible for me to establish the fact that p without coming to know
that p.4
The author notes in the same time that this pragmatic paradox does not
entail any logical circularity in the deﬁnition of knowledge:
I don't claim that the admitted deﬁnition of knowledge is logically circular. But I
claim that it is pragmatically circular, i.e. necessarily it becomes self-defeatingly
circular, in its application to itself. In other words, its relation to the above case of
4Zemach (1969), p. 284.
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circularity is similar to the relation of p, but I don't believe that p or I cannot
make statements in English to p and not p.5
Formally speaking, this means that Kp → p is still valid but not its
converse p→ Kp, because the latter does not represent a proper formalization
of the condition under which a truth can be stated. A more appropriate
modal version of this condition would be something in the form K(Kp → p),
thus implying the validity of Kp → KKp by distributivity of the operator K
and conﬁrming the view of Hintikka (1962) according to which the Theorem
of Epistemic Introspection is closely related to the same logic of statements
as the three paradoxes considered in this paper.
The apparent ﬂavor of a paradox is caused here by a twofold semantic
and pragmatic understanding of the problem. On the one hand, knowledge
presupposes truth: p is known provided that p is true. On the other hand,
any discourse about truth presupposes that one does have knowledge: p can
be said to be true only if p is known to be true. Albeit apparent only, such
a paralogism supports the diﬃculty that is expressed by Fitch's Theorem 1
and instantiated by Moore's statements. That is: declarative sentences do
not share the same logic as their statements, and Fitch's Paradox shows to
what extent a careless use of formalism is more likely to muddle the situation
than to throw some light upon the initial trouble.
In order to emphasize the role of utterance and its resulting statements
in the interpretation of our daily reasonings, we propose in the following a
formal language from an anti-realist perspective of truth: focused on the
speaker's attitudes, on the one hand; based on a non-referential semantics,
on the other hand.
3. Question-Answer Semantics
If the assessment of a reasoning should take into account the context in
which the latter is performed, then the impersonal point of view that is
expressed by the Platonician deﬁnition of knowledge should be superseded
by a more relative point of view. Rebuschi & Lihoreau (2009) set forth a
contextualist semantics in this sense: insisting upon the inﬂuence of context
in the assignment of knowledge to an agent, both authors argue that
the question is to know which context we deal with. Two large conceptions are
opposing to each other: the one, contextualism, according to which the knowledge
of an agent is dependent upon the context of assignment; the other, subjectivism,
5Zemach (1969), p. 283. A further connection is made in this quotation between
Moore's and Zemach's Paradoxes.
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which considers that the knowledge of the agent is dependent upon his (her) own
context, i.e. his (her) own epistemic standards. In both cases we have to do with
relativist conceptions of knowledge.6
For this purpose, we suggest a subjectivist approach of knowledge assign-
ment: an agent can be said to know the truth of a sentence only if (sh)he has
a suﬃcient ground to justify it and deny the converse (i.e. that (s)he does
not know that p or, worse, that (s)he knows p to be false). Such an approach
is likely to assimilate belief with knowledge: if the objective truth of p is
not taken into account, then knowledge is made synonymous with certainty,
or strong belief. But such an apparent disadvantage may be qualiﬁed in
two respects: knowledge may be presented as a common belief shared by a
set of speakers; the following semantic framework purports to have its own
advantages in turn.
By a Question-Answer Semantics (thereafter: QAS), we mean a seman-
tic framework in which the meaning of a sentence is determined by a set of
questions about this sentence and its corresponding sentences. Our subjec-
tivist approach entails that the meaning is ﬁxed by the speaker: the sentence
makes sense through a speech act and gives a sense to the whole reasoning
in which it occurs. Roughly speaking, this semantic framework is composed
of a statement-forming operator Q, a logical matrix and a valuation function
A; let us consider a set of resulting logics, namely: the logics of accep-
tance and rejection (ARV ). For every sentence p, Q applies to p to form a
declarative statement; the aim of such a speech act is telling the truth, in
accordance to what Searle & Vanderveken (1985) called by assertive acts.
Q(p) = 〈q1(p),...,qn(p)〉 includes at least n = 2 ordered questions about a
sentence, whereby q1(p): Is p true? and q2(p): Is p false?. The question is
of a metalinguistic order: it implicitly addresses the speaker, who implicitly
answers to it by performing his (her) speech act. Assuming that the sense of
the sentence is ﬁxed by the set of these questions, its reference is denoted by
the set of the corresponding answers and results in a logical value in QAS:
yes and no are the basic answers, to be symbolized by 1 and 0. But other
possible sorts of answers can be devised in a more probabilistic approach,
when maybe is inserted between yes and no. As a matter of fact, the
number of logical values is V = mn, where n symbolizes the number of ques-
tions and m the number of the sorts of answers that can be given to each
question.
This semantics is algebraic, given that is establishes an ordering relation
between the logical values in order to characterize the logical operations. It is
non-referential, in the sense that a logical value is not a usual truth-value but
6Rebuschi & Lihoreau (2009), p. 55.
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stands for a truth-claim that accounts for the preceding distinction between
truth and truth-claim. If m = n = 2 , we thus obtain a system AR4 with
4 logical values expressing the speciﬁc degree of strength of a declarative
attitude: A(p) = 〈1, 0〉 for certainty, A(p) = 〈1, 1〉 for conjecture, A(p) =
〈0, 0〉 for doubt, andA(p) = 〈0, 1〉 for negative certainty. The number n of the
questions can thus be modiﬁed to give another characterization of the truth-
claims. For example, let Q(p) = 〈q1(p),q2(p),q3(p)〉 with q1(p): Is there
every reason to hold p as true?, q2(p): Is there some (but not all) reason to
hold p as true?, and q3(p): Is there no reason to hold p as true?. We thus
obtain an extended logic AR8 with eight logical values, thus equating truth-
claims with degrees of belief whose optimal elements correspond to cases of
subjective knowledge.
The notion of a degree of strength is inherited from Searle's speech act
theory; but contrary to its subsequent expression in illocutionary logic, our
semantic framework is not a Kripkean model with possible worlds; rather, it is
a many-valued model. QAS also shares with dialogic the purpose to reject
the traditional distinction between semantics and pragmatics by rejecting
the referential or truth-conditional view of meaning; rather, it intends to
determine the meaning of sentences by means of a question-answer game,
whether this game takes place between two agents or I and Nature.
Returning to the three preceding paradoxes, AR4 accounts for the cases
in which a trouble does arise or does not. Fitch's Theorem 1 expounds an
objectionable logical form, because one and the same a occurs both in the
statement act and its sentential content; in such a case, the semantic frame-
work of AR4 shows that the premise from which Fitch's Paradox emerged
is incoherent7 because it both aﬃrms and denies the same attitude of cer-
tainty uttered by the speaker: A(p) = 〈1, 0〉, and A(p) 6= 〈1, 0〉. However,
the trouble does not arise if the degree of strength of the statement act is
smaller than that of the attitude expressed in the sentential content. Thus,
the following variant of Moore's Paradox is not objectionable at all: p, but I
don't know whether p, given that the speaker expresses a belief synonymous
with conjecture and thereby concedes that (s)he does not have a proof for
p. Hintikka mentioned such a variant in his epistemic logic: B(p ∧ ∼Kp).
7Incoherent, and not inconsistent. An agent cannot give two diﬀerent answers to one
and the same question in AR4, which characterizes the property of incoherence. Never-
theless, (s)he may give the same answer to two diﬀerent questions: (s)he may admit the
truth and the falsehood of one and the same sentence at once, so long as (s)he is not
asserting anything about it and is merely conjecturing. The case of conjecture can be
inconsistent in AR4, since the logical value 〈1, 1〉 means that the speaker believes in a
weaker sense of the word that both p and ∼p. About the diﬀerence between incoherence
and inconsistency, see (2009b), especially section 4.
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Our account of this formula in AR4 consists in arguing that the speaker
merely believes p (A(p) = 〈1, 1〉) without being certain of it (A(p) 6= 〈1, 0〉),
where the concepts of knowledge and belief don't occur as modal operators
but correspond to logical values that characterize various degrees of strength.
Consequently, the logical values refer to degrees of belief, and the degrees of
belief express degrees of strength in the declarative acts (or statements).
4. Conclusion: the answer is in the question
We assumed that a logical paradox is relevant provided that it helps to em-
phasize a general feature in our ways of reasoning; if so, then philosophical
logics are worthwhile if they catch our attention to the problem before any
solution to it. Any narrow and hasty search for a solution to the paradox
yields nothing but dissolution of the problem, and its philosophical import is
irrelevant; by contrast, our treatment of the epistemic paradoxes attempted
to emphasize the role of statements acts within a many-valued semantics.
This adoption of many-valuedness purports to satisfy further explanatory
needs. On the one hand, QAS restores the Principle of Bivalence with some
respect: the choice of two answers among yes and no, within a semantics
where the two basic values are not the referential properties of truth and false-
hood but, rather, the pragmatic acts of aﬃrmation and denial. On the other
hand, QAS results from a more general reﬂection where the three epistemic
paradoxes occur as mere particular symptoms: our anti-realist semantics of
speech acts resulted in a question-answer game whose application goes be-
yond the restricted case of epistemic modalities. The underlying theory of
meaning for this game has been presented as an extension of the Fregean
distinction between sense and reference, without truth-values and with alter-
native logical values. The distinction between several degrees of belief in a
discourse of truth has found some applications in the realm of Indian logics8;
the composite nature of these logical values also led to an original algebraic
semantics for oppositions, where opposite-forming operators are deﬁned re-
cursively and replace the Tarskian notions of consequence and truth by those
of opposition and negation9.
An alternative process of logical analysis has been suggested by means of
many-valuedness, and we attempted to show at the same time that the real
8See Schang (2009a) and (2011), where two non-classical logics are reconstructed in
the line of QAS: the Jain theory of seven-fold predication, and N	ag	arjuna's Principle of
Four-Cornered Negation.
9See Schang (2010a), where the valuations don't refer to epistemic attitudes because
they rely upon some other sorts of questions Q than those occurring in ARV .
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import of a logical paradox does not lie so much in the ways of solving it
than in the reasons of its occurrence.
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